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NOTES

22
charities vested at the time the power of appointment was exercised by the donee,
and it follows that, as the appointment was subsequently found valid, it should
have been considered as valid from the time of its exercise.
Following the logic of Emanuelson and Moorman the trust income in Fidelity
was, in effect, "permanently set aside," and by the terms of the trust instrument
the income was to be used exclusively for charitable purposes. On either of these
bases, the recovery of taxes should have been granted.
By adopting a strict interpretation of the applicable code section, the court in
Fidelity Trust Co. v. United States contravenes a well-established policy of liberal
statutory interpretation favoring charitable gifts. Section 162 of the Internal Revenue Code should have been interpreted by the court to effectuate both the charitable intent of the testator and the legislative intent of Congress.
Douglas Liechty

EVIDENCE: TE PowER OF A JUROR TO ImPEACH HIS OWN VERDICT
Should jurors be empowered to impeach their own verdict by offering affidavits
which tend to show misconduct, either their own or that of third parties, in arriving at their verdict? In Kollert v. Cundi1f', on a motion for a new trial, the plaintiffs offered jurors' affidavits alleging that the jury, in a personal injury action
brought by six co-plaintiffs, voted against one plaintiff and summoned the bailiff
to obtain additional instructions as to the five remaining plaintiffs. They further
alleged the bailiff returned to the jury room and advised that there need not be
further instructions since a verdict had already been reached; that in addition,
the jury foreman had visited the accident scene during a night recess and made a
report on the traffic signals to the jury.
The California Supreme Court affirmed rejection of the affidavits on the ground
that they were presented by jurors. In so doing, the court adhered to the long
applied and often criticized general rule that jurors will not be allowed to impeach
their own verdict.
Lord Mansfield forged the rule in 1785, in Vaise v. Delaval,2 holding that
jurors could not attest to their own misconduct, apparently reversing the current
of the common law. As presently applied, the exclusionary rule prohibits juror
testimony as to the misconduct of third parties as well. Prior to Vaise, courts
considered such evidence acceptable. 3 Subsequently English and American courts
have unhesitatingly applied the Mansfield rule. Their reasoning has been based on
the acknowledged policy favoring certainty of verdicts in general over rectifying
possible injustice in individual cases. 4 In addition, they fear tampering from disappointed litigants and consequent corruption of jurors.5
The California cases have professed general adherence to the prevailing view.0
22
1n re Walker's Estate, 53 N.Y.S.2d 102 (N.Y. 1944).
150 Cal. 2d ........ 329 P.2d 897 (1958).

2 1 T.R. 11, 99 Eng. Rep. 944 (K.B., 1785) ; Jurors "tossed up," and although misconduct,
Mansfield indicates such information must be gathered from another source.
3
Norman v. Beamont, Willes 484, 125 Eng. Rep. 1281 (1744); Phillips v. Fowler, Barnes
441, 94 Eng. Rep. 994 (1735).
4 See McDonald v. Pless, 283 U.S. 264 (1915).
5 See Saltzman v. Sunset Tel. & Tel. Co., 125 Cal. 501, 505, 58 Pac. 169, 170 (1899).
6 Siemsen v. Oakland, S. L. & H. Elec. Ry., 134 Cal. 494, 66 Pac. 672 (1901) ; People v.
Zelver, 135 Cal. App. 2d 226, 287 P.2d 183 (1955); Tierney v. Chas. Nelson Co., 19 Cal. App.
2d 34, 64 P.2d 1150 (1937).
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The legislature has, however, in opposition to the bellwether case on the subject,
expressly provided an exception where verdicts have been obtained by chance.7 A
judicial exception which has arisen permits juror testimony when a juror has intentionally concealed bias on voir dire.8 Although this is misconduct which results
in setting aside a verdict, the exception seems based on the theory that the purpose
of the evidence is to establish grounds for disqualificationof a juror as of the time
of impanelment rather than impeachment of a verdict by a properly impaneled
juryY The 1954 case of Shipley v. Permanente Hospitals ° stands for an extension
of this judicial exception, declaring that the concealment need not be intentional.
Aside from these noted exceptions, California courts would not accept juror
affidavits to the effect that other jurors visited the scene of the accident, noting its
characteristics;" that a juror discussed medical testimony with her doctor;12 or
that a bailiff informed a juror of the bad reputation of the defendant 13
and disclosed
the legal effect and consequences of a particular contemplated verdict.
The court, in Kollert, discussed Shipley and disapproved certain language
therein to the effect that if there were any irregularities in the proceedings under
the Code of Civil Procedure, they could be shown by juror affidavit.14 Then the
court stated: 15
... [W]hether or not additionalexceptions may be justified under some circumstances,
we are of the view that the allegations of the affidavit before us, even if taken as true,
do not warrant a departure from the general rule. (Emphasis added.)

Does this language warrant an inference that the court would be disposed to relax
the rule under exceptional circumstances even though the facts do not fall within
the presently recognized exceptions? It might. However, since the meaning of irregularities, according to the opinion, is not to be liberalized, 16 the court has little
judicial basis on which to justify relaxation of the rule.
7 CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 657: "The verdict may be vacated and any other decision may
be modified or vacated in whole or in part, and a new or further trial granted on all or part
of the issues, on the application of the party aggrieved, for any of the following causes, materially affecting the substantial rights of such party:
1. Irregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury or adverse party or any order of
the court or abuse of discretion by which either party was prevented from having a fair trial;
2. Misconduct of the jury; and whenever any one or more of the jurors have been induced
to assent to any general or special verdict, or to a finding on any question submitted to them
by the court, by a resort to the determination of chance, such misconduct may be proved by
the affidavit of any one of the jurors; .... " (Emphasis added.)
8 Williams v. Bridges, 140 Cal. App. 537, 35 P.2d 407 (1934). See also Pollind v. Pollich,
78 Cal. App. 2d 87, 177 P.2d 63 (1947).
9 Tierney v. Chas. Nelson Co., 19 Cal. App. 2d 34, 64 P.2d 1150 (1937). See Dunford v.
General Water Heater Corp., 150 Cal. App. 2d 260, 267, 309 P.2d 958, 962 (1957) (concurring
opinion). See also Note, 23 CALIF. L. REV. 359 (1935).
10 127 Cal. App. 2d 417, 274 P.2d 53 (1954); the court stated that if the exception is
correct in principle there is no reason to require intentional concealment. See Note, 2 U.C.L.A.
L. REv. 278 (1955) to the effect that this case clarifies and broadens an existing exception to
the common law rule.
11 Maffeo v. Holmes, 47 Cal. App. 2d 292, 117 P.2d 948 (1941).
12 Kritzer v. Citron, 101 Cal. App. 2d 33, 224 P.2d 808 (1950) (dictum).
13 People v. Gidney, 10 Cal. 2d 138, 73 P.2d 1186 (1937).
14 See note 7 supra.
15 50 Cal. 2d at ......... 329 P.2d at 900.
16 Id. at ......... 329 P.2d at 900.
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On the other hand Justice Carter asserts in a vigorous dissent that this long
parroted dogma should be rejected.17 He would decide, case by case, whether the
misconduct was such an abberration from desired formality as to provide grounds
for a new trial.
Should this rigid exclusionary rule be relaxed and inquiry made into proper
substantive grounds on which to impeach verdicts based on juror affidavits? An
answer requires a further inquiry into the variety of reasons, both of policy and
principle, advanced in its support.
The rule which renders jurors powerless to impeach their own verdict has been
said to rest in part on the principle that prevents the introduction of parol evidence to vary the final written manifestation of prior deliberation.' 8 Such a principle is obviously born of policy which seeks certainty and conclusiveness of verdict
as desirable ends. Thus affidavits will not be received to explain a juror's motive' 9
or what individual jurors intended by their verdicts, 2° or that the verdict did not
fairly express the opinion of the jury.21
On the other hand the law generally has specified canons of proper jury conduct, the contravention of which is grounds for a new trial if, in the discretion of the
court, there appears to be substantial prejudice to the litigant. 22 An unauthorized
view of the scene, 23 or juror inspection of evidence during recess have been deemed
grounds for reversal. 24 These acts of misconduct are irregularities the law will not
indulge and Professor Wigmore indicates the parol evidence rule should not preclude jurors from proving them 25
Another justification advanced for the rule is that in order for the jury to
retain its independence a juror should be privileged in his communications. 26 It is
not meant to assail the soundness of this principle but only to question the extent
of its application. It would be limited in one respect when a juror voluntarily pre27
sents his own affidavit since in so doing he can be said to waive his privilege.
Finally, it is doubtful that acts of misconduct as in Kollert can be classified as
"juror communication."
Lord Mansfield, in Vaise, based his decision on still other grounds. 28 He observed that tossing coins to arrive at a verdict was a high misdemeanor. He then
relied on the principle that one will not be heard to allege his own turpitude, concluding that such testimony will not be received. This principle no longer exists
as voluntary confessions of guilt are made each day. In California one need only
note the presently discussed statute to find that the legislature explicitly has
changed the law squarely on the facts before Mansfield. 2 9
17Id. at

.......
329 P.2d at 901 (dissenting opinion).
1 1 GREENLEAF, EVIDENCE § 252 a (16th ed. 1899).
19 People v. Hughes, 29 Cal. 257 (1865); juror consented to avoid remaining in jury
room all night.
2o Mish v. Brokus, 97 Cal. App. 2d 770, 218 P.2d 849 (1950) ; it was held error to deny
a motion to strike 11 jurors' affidavits explaining their intention.
21 People v. Wyman, 15 Cal. 70 (1860).
22

HAyNE,

NEW

TpaAL

&AppEAL, ch. 10, Grounds of the Motion-Misconduct of the Jury

(rev.2 ed.
1912).
3
Maffeo v. Holmes, 47 Cal. App. 2d 292, 117 P.2d 948 (dictum).
24
Tunmore v. McLeish, 45 Cal. App. 266, 187 Pac. 443 (1919).
2 8 WisoE,EviDEN E § 2352 (3d ed. 1940).
20See note 5 supra.
27 8 WIGmoRE, Evi
cE § 2346 (3d ed. 1940).
28 See note 5 supra.
29
CAL. CODE Civ. PRoc. § 657 (2).
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Logically, then, it should not be out of the range of the jury to offer evidence of
overt, verifiable misconduct. This conduct is to be distinguished from the juror's
personal thoughts and inward motives leading to his final decision. With respect to
legal effect it would appear that no inherent difference exists between throwing
coins in order to arrive at a verdict, making unauthorized visits to the scene of the
accident and inspecting evidence during recess. Assuming material prejudice to the
losing litigant, all such acts, as well as misconduct by a bailiff, would present
grounds for reversal. The judicial exception permitting jurors' affidavits to show
concealment on voir dire fails to serve here since, as noted, it is aimed at establishing grounds for disqualification at the outset of the trial.
Although the rule is general, criticism has precipitated a more liberal rule elsewhere. These courts, with an eye toward the conflicting interests involved, have
struck the balance more toward individual justice. The case of Wright v. Illinois &
Miss. Tel. Co. 3 0 is the source of the "Iowa rule" allowing affidavits of jurors to be

received on matters not inherent in the verdict, i.e., overt acts of misconduct readily
capable of proof. The Supreme Court of Kansas, questioning the wisdom of the
general rule in a case where a juror allegedly was under the influence of alcohol,
declared that since extrinsic proof of overt acts is accessible to the court, evidence
by the jurors of such acts should be allowed. 3' Some states have relaxed the rule
33
32
by a statute comparable to California's4 and still others by judicial decision.
3
Judge Learned Hand has stated:
The whole subject has been obscured, apparently beyond hope of clarification, by

Lord Mansfield's often quoted language in Vaise v. Delaval....

and also wrote to the effect that repetition of such a rule "offers an escape from
embarrassing chores." Not only have the commentators criticized inflexible adherence to the rule35 but both the Model Code of Evidence 36 and the Uniform Rules
of Evidence 37 have incorporated the liberal view. Both provide that jurors may
testify as to conditions, either outside or inside the jury room, that have a material
bearing on the validity of the verdict. This would seem sufficiently broad to cover
misconduct, either by a juror or third party as in Kollert. Otherwise those best
qualified to provide the evidence will continue to be excluded from doing so.
The policy which endorses certainty and seeks to prevent the wholesale reversal
of verdicts is unquestionably desirable. Assuming that certainty is to prevail over
injustice in individual cases, it is submitted that both ends may be served even
though the court is willing to admit juror affidavits. The questions raised should
concern the substantive grounds on which they will be received, and not whether
30 20 Iowa 195 (1866).
31 Perry v. Bailey, 12 Kan. 539 (1874).
32 IDAHO ConE § 10-602 (1948) ; MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 93-5603 (1949) ; N.D. REV.
COnE § 28-1902 (1943) ; S.D. CODE § 33-1605 (1939) ; UTAH CODE ANN. Rule 59 (1953) ; WASH.
REV. CODE § 4.76.020 (1951) ; and see TEXAS RULES OF CIV. PROC., Rule 327 for liberalization

of the general rule.
33 See Russ v. State, 95 So. 2d 594 (Fla. 1957); Dallas Ry. and Terminal Co. v. Bishop,
203 S.W.2d 651 (Texas 1947) ; State v. Parker, 25 Wash. 405, 65 Pac. 776 (1901). See also for
case involving misconduct of a bailiff, Heller v. People, 22 Colo. 11, 43 Pac. 124 (1895).
34 Jorgenson v. York Ice Mach., 160 F.2d 432, 435 (2d Cir. 1947) ; cert. denied, 332 U.S.
764 (1947).
35 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 2352, 2354 (3d ed. 1940).
36 MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE, Rule 301 (1942).
37 UNIFORm RULES

or

EVIDENCE,

Rule 44 (1953).

